Within the general conversations on violence today, including those of postmodern deconstruction, feminism, poststructuralism, and various others, Ricoeur's essay, "Language and Violence," takes the most general perspectivc possible, including within its sweep aJl the essays of this volunlC. For, in recent philosophical discourses on violence. the score of considerntion onen extcnds even to texts within a view of signst and is not limited to interpersonal relations of one will in relation to another. And Ricoeur's artic)e extends even beyond this to violenee in nature t thus setting the stage for a11 of the treatises in this volume. This artiele also shows the importance of the confrontation between language and vioJence as underlying all human problems. It thus takes on a special importanee for us in that it address the broadest extension of violence between two extremes: the violence of nature, as in hurricanes; and human violence as in the ease of murder. Most of the essays in this volume deal with human violencc of one fonn or another rather than the violence of nature, thus leaving Ricoeur's in a unique place in breadth. Ricoeur brings these two together in the realm of the intermediate, human violence. This lattcr is inclusive of the violence of nature within human being, and stretches the interrelation in deJving into the ramifications in the relation between language and violence. Ricoeur, thus, considers violence external to uS t then, the nature intemalized that overwhelms US, and finally the violence of one wiJl against another. It is in this context that violence and language are seen as opposites. And Ricoeur interprets the opposition between language and violence to be between coherent discourse and violence, but a coherent discourse not possessed by anyone specific, for that would be a fraudulent discourse, one that attempts to make a philosophical particularity prevail. And falsitied words make language thc voice of violence; violence speaks. UThat which speaks, in relation to the meaning, is
violence" [35] . For Ricoeur, such violence of Janguage arises not from language as code or from the anatomy of language, but, rather, from language as discourse. The code is innocent, since it does not speak. Rather, only discourse speaks. Thus, in contrast to postmodern deconstruction's reduction of language, Ricoeur does not consider violence to be linked to language as code, but, rather, to discourse. He explicitly and clearly distinguishes words in speech fTom the signs in dictionaries, which are not yet words, but merely signs delineated by other signs in the code. But they take on meaning only in the moment of discourse of a sentence. This is the field of the confrontation between violence and language, and not as later postmodern deconstruction would have it, between the code and violence. And, in the three spheres of politics, poetry, and philosophy, it is the word that is the focus of violence and meaning in discourse.
In the contcxt of political violence, Ricoeur highlights the role of discourse in seduction, persuasion, and flattery, showing in this context the preference for the sophist to that of the executioner. But the violence of tyranny and revolutions does not exhaust violence of politics, since politics exists because the city rests on the overcoming of private violence brought to the submission to a ru1e of law. UThe words of the city bear this universal mark, which is a kind of non-violence" [37] . And this rule of law is a sort of power or violence that works through private violence to speak to language ofvalue and honor, allowing the common will to conquer our wills.
And even the most innocent of language, that of the poet, does not escape the tension of meaning and violent particularity. Tbe poet, in giving himself up to meaning, in letting be, is where language is least at our disposition, and thus is a non-violence of discourse. Yet it is precisely here that the violence of particularity arises. Bringing Being to the word or to meaning is a capture of Being in the word, thus showing the appearance of the violent man at the point where being and meaning unfold. "The poet is the violent man who forces things to speak. It is poetic abduclion" [38] .
And the third realm of the tension of violence and language is that of philosophy, understood as the "desire for meaning, by the ehoice in favor of coherent discourse tt , by an option for "order and eoherenee tt [38] [39] . With this understanding, as will be seen in some of the tater artieles, Rieoeur supplies a context for dialogue with postmodern deconstruction and its will to believe in logos and the priority of the negativity latent within that option. There are two contexts of violence in philosophical language: first, in the violence ofthe point of departure or a beginning as an exercise of force; then there is the violence of a particularity, a failure to recover totally one's presuppositions; and finally, the violence of premature conclusion, in that the process of totalization, which can never be cJosed, is arbitrarily tenninated in, for instance, a written account or book.
Ricoeur presents three rational conclusions around the notion ofrational meaning or discourse that underlies an ofhis reflection
here. The first is the goal of language that must obtain if this refleetion is to make sense, giving violence an opposite. Ricoeur i5 here thinking not of an exterior finality imposed from without, but of the Aristotelian context of the fun manifestation of language. somewhat in the sense of Humboldt's view of the "genesis of Janguage as the complete manifestation of the mind, as its seIf-mani festation, its unfolding in plenitude" [39] . This view of language as a call to express the thinkable nlakes possible the dialectie of this artiete. Second, in this theoretical context of rational meaning, understanding cannot be reduced to calculation or to instrumental intelligence. Any such reduction of reason to understanding ends inevitably in violence. And finally, in this theoretical context, when caleulative intelligence takes hold of language, it "produces the same efTects of nonsense" [39] . In this context of calculation, knowing the structure of language, or, Ricoeur might add today, to know the process of the structural relations, "does not advance one a step in rational meaning. For what is questioned is the meaning of discourse, not the structure of the keyboard on which it plays....Instrumental intelligence and senseJess existence are the twin orphans of the death of meaning" [39] . Rieoeur now turns to practical conelusions. Ricoeur offers a few simple nllcs fOT living the intennediary role between language and violence. He eontends that we must recognize the fundamental opposition between Janguage and violence as the precondition for recognizing violence where it appears and for having recourse to it when necessary. And such a recourse to violence is always a "limited culpability," a calculated fault; he who calls a crime a crime is already on the road to meaning and salvation" [40] . Further, it is necessary to bear witness to this formal truth of the non-violence of discourse as an imperative; uThou shalt not kin:· recognizing the other as a rational being to be honored. And the pressure from such a morality of conviction on the morality of responsibility leads, for instance in war, not doing anything that would prevent peace. And the unique role of the non-violent person is to testi fy to all the goals ofhistory and ofviolence. And ifsuch non-violence belongs to the ethics of conviction, it can never take the place of the morality of responsibility. Here, in this essay, over thirty years ago, we already see the explicit dialectic between the ethics of conviction, leading to teleological ethics, and to a deontological ethics of responsibility, the latter of which leads back to a second naivete regarding an ethics in the concrete situation of conviction.
Ricoeur ends this essay with another rule, that of the non-violent practice of discourse itself. While no claim is made in favor of one mode of discourse, it, rather, respects the plurality and diversity of Janguages, leaving the modes of discourse in their proper place. uRespect for the multiplicity, diversity, and hierarchy of languages is the only way for men to work towards rational meaning." [40] .
Although he does not dwell on it, Ricoeur has opened the discourse to violence in nature and in the human situation that we perpetrate against oße ano'ther, thus opening the door for the discussion with the postmodern deconstructionists, for whom violcnce does not support the centrality of the human in a humanism. This we shall now see as OUf context for beginning this voJume. We now turn to the second article in this collection: UTaming Violence: Ricoeur and Dcrrida:' which relates Ricoeur's thinking to the recent broad context ofviolence in postmodemity.
Discussions of violence have recently taken a central role in postmodern conversations of philosophy/nonphilosophy. According to the usual script of deconstruction, the violence of phi losophy and of ontology and, indeed, of logos in general and of all meaning fonnation is apower play that must be subverted by the deconstructive process. Within this general postmodern conversation, PauJ Ricoeur, in his own way, addresses the phenomena that deconstruction indicates as violent, taking them in a more positive way. In späte of this fundamental difference, Ricoeur considers violence and Janguage as contraries to Uoccupy the totality of the human field" [32] .
Within this broad context, this artiele focuses first on postmodern deconstruction's opposition to the violence of philosophy and logocentrism; then on the very violence latent within the deconstructive process, beginning with that in relation to a basic wi11 to believe, contrasting this interpretation of violence with the surplus of meaning considered not as violence, but rather as an attempt to render account of an excess or fullness of sense. Second, the violence within deconstruction's diacritical view of language and within its view of the living present is considered, clarifying the fundamental nature of the violence of deconstruction.
Then, the role of violence in Ricoeur's philosophy is considered in relation to the surplus ofmeaning, the living present, and language taken as discourse. Thus, the thesis of this article contends that deconstruction misinterprets the relation between violence and language due to its view of the Iiving present and sign, and that, with a revision in this view of language (sign, word, and discourse) and the living present, the dialectic between violence and language can be reread and replaced in a context that makes sense out of making sense.
Instead of considering violence to be intrinsic to sense, to the living present, to presence and to anything established, it is possible, according to this article, to see the violence intrinsic to the very deconstructive process itself, to clotural reading, in its priority given to the closures of sense, time, sign, presence: Le. in the view that anything that is produced by the flux other then the undecidable is violent. Thus, we can see that violence is intrinsic to the whole deconstructive process at a basic level. In contrast to deconstruction, Ricoeur's priorities do allow fOT saying something to someone and fOT a viable semantic and ethical framework for reflection today.
Gary Herbert, in the article "The Anatomy of Rights-Based
4)
Violence," shows in an extreme)y clear and precise way that the Jogic ofnatural rights easily and inevitably leads to the conceptual legitimization of violence, so that the conceptual culprit of much modem violence is the western liberal-rights tradition itself. And, in its more subtle fonns, this emphasis on individual rights and liberties manifests itselfin the defense ofprivileges and in various forms of nonrecognition. The conelusion drawn by the crities of the liberal-rights tradition is that there can be no solution to the problems of violence that does not penetrate to, and modify or refonn these deeper conceptual substructures, so that what obtains is a "eoexistent freedom,u where the satisfaetion of one person's rights does not have to come at the expense of another person's rights. UIt is to promote a system of rights in which, in the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'the recognition of man by man' becomes a moral priority" [60] . Herbert shows clearly how the recognition of individual rights is considered the metaphysicat a prior; of all moral and political judgment, and al1 who resist this are dismissed as irrational. Herbert sees Merleau-Ponty's positing of"the recognition ofman by man" as required for transcending the classical rights-based legitimization of violence. It is Herbert's suggestion that the revolutionary recommendations for change by these crities of political-liberaJism only point the way to transformation of violence, easily issuing in u new forms of violence that are often conceptually invisible to those who argue for them," remaining nevertheless within the liberal-rights theory and thus "subject to versions of the same critique." This becomes clear in tracing out the evolution of rights theory and violence in it.
Herbert traces the emergence of the idea of individual rights from Thomas Hobbes' view of the human natural conditioß, showing its expression as the survival impulse in relation to the restless desire for power that serves this impulse. This condition is not one of evil or intrinsic violence, hut rather one in which it is reasonable for humans to have recourse to violence. According to Hobbes, we have a right to whatever measures we deern necessary to insure our survival, security and wellbeing, even though we could be wrong in this assessment. This is limited only by the power of our own imagination, since it exposes potential threats and justifiable responses as justifiable violence. uUnmediated natural rights (those rights one must defend by himselt) becomes a recipe for and justification of unlimited violence whenever and wherever thcre is no sovereign authority, and one finds himself in a situation where he must serve as the sole guarantor of his own security'" [65] . Unmediated rights leads to unending violence, with each attempting to protect himlherself from real or imagined threats, thus themselves becoming a threat to another. Thus the state of nature is one of unending violence. The posed solution comes by way of invoking an irresistible power, a sovereign with absolute power that could be a guarantee against being subject to violence. The sovereign power serves as a threat allowing subjects to know with certainty they are safe, since no one would willingly bring down the power of the sovereign upon hirnself for such acts. Herbert says: uThe problem for subsequent philosophers in the liberal-rights tradition was to save us from such solutions, Le., from rights based abuse of sovereign authority. What was needed was another more sociable way of conceiving the mediation of fights that simultaneously (1) avoided the reasonableness of. violence and (2) escaped the need for submission to a sovereign with absolute power;' with the lauer possibly leading to rights-based abuse of sovereign authority.
Locke adds to Hobbes' concept of rights a reflexivity that entails a natural ownership of investing his labor in things. "One owns all his own possessions and his own self as weil. One's life is one's property" [68] . By considering the labor of consciousness exercised on himself the source of acknowledging one's actions as one's own, and thus making the person the sole property of oneself, Locke generates the foundations of natural responsibility in producing the foundations of natural rights. Locke considers fights to precede and preexist all obligations, thus agreeing with l-lobbes regarding the unilateral character of rights.
Herbert indicates that the philosophical corrective and critique of such rights-inspired violence comes from Immanuel Kant and Gottlieb Fichte. They viewed the natural condition to be one of no rights, since none are recognized, thus abandoning the unilateral character of rights. Rights exist only where there is the corresponding obligations to respect these rights. Since such a view does not supposedly aJlow rights to clash, acts of violence would be out of the question. AJong this line, Herbert indicates that Kant defined a right as "the capacity for putting others under obligation," thus making one's own right depend on the other's capacity to be obligated, which can only obtain if the other is free or autonomous, ahle to imputc onc's own actions to oneself, and thus be aperson. Herbert quotes an important text of Kant to show the connection among rights, fTeedom and obligation: "We know our own freedom (from which all moral1aws and so a11 rights as weil as duties proceed) only through the moral inlperative which is aproposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, the concept of a right, can afterward be explicated. another free person can invoke obligation. And it is sufficient that mutual recognition of right be provided for without relying on the morality of man's inner motives, which can hardly be absolutely pure for humans, but simpJy by insisting on the exlerna/ cOllformity of his will to the law. Thus, each perceives the other externallyasan independent will whose actions can be imputed to hirn or her. Thus, one's capacity to obligate another and one's rights depend on one's capacity to reveal oneselfto the other as a free being, one who imputes his actions to hirnself. Further, all rights are dependent "upon the reciprocally sustaining external relationship ofwill to will in which each extemally recognizes (or acknowledges)the other as intemal1y free" [72] .
In a similar vein, Fichte says one must manifest free activity by restricting oneself t by respecting the other·s property, thus revealing oneself as an autonomous being t aperson, one capable of being obligated. And the other, only by reciprocating, can obligate one as weil. Tbe failure of this leads to reestablishment of the conditions of mutual violence, leading Kant to affirm that the only original right belonging to every man in virtue of hislher humanity Is freedom "insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with the universal law" [H, 73, Kant, MM, 63] . By fol1owing the law of always treating the others as free beings and not as mere things, each becomes a lawful member of the community and yet remains completely free.
It can be seen that such a conception of rights in which rights and obligations are eorrelative does not overcome the problem of rights-based violence if mutual recognition is not assured. Kant espouses a "law of reeiprocal coercion," that is "necessarily in accord with the freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom n [MM, 58] . Herbert contends that, for Kant, we are free because we have authorized each other's possessions and the existence of a sovereign power to guarantee those possessions. And punishment for the violation of one's rights must take the fonn of retribution, not at all100ked upon as violence by Kant. In fact, it is a repudiation of violence, in that it, and it alone, is the recognition and respect for thc dignity of each. as free and responsible.
The contemporary view of rights has supplanted them from the Kantian concern for moral autonomy, no longer requiring self-ownership and individual autonomy for human dignity. This move does aHow the extension of idea of rights to the senile and otherwise mentally impaired, to fetuses, ete., overcoming certain violence in our society. Herbert shows that the contemporary 10ss of individual autonomy of the will and dignity has diverted attention to human needs. so that now, human dignity is measured by the material conditions of one's life. Those with lack in this area have then been denied basic human dignity, a condition fonned upon people by the competitive structures of industrialized society, and hence victimized by a subtle violence committed upon them. And the Kantian demand that people "assert the right of humanity in their own persons 9 '
[76] easily becomes the justification of a naked demand for satisfaction and recognition, with nothing to limit the demand or give it meaning other than the demand itself, augmented, perhaps, by the individual 's personal assessment of the material conditions of life he or she needs to have met in order to enjoy basic human dignity. This leads in many directions, including the conclusion of being wronged simply because someone else has more, or has accomplished more and thus appears to be worth more. Herbert sees herein the danger of areturn to the immediacy of Hobbesian natural right and of the conceptual content of those structurcs condemned for their legitimation of structural violence. Thus, under the guise of overcoming structural violence, we see areturn 1.. \ to another structural vioJence, as l'lcrbert shows, with the concept of human fights as a conccptual enabler, untempered by considerations ofpersonal responsibility. He goes on to show that the "act by which one asserts the fight of humanity in his own person is 10gicaJly indistinguishable from thc act by which one does violence to another. The structures ofviolence have not been escaped" [80] . He sees that perhaps areturn to Kantian-Fichtean idea of personal responsibility or to some Hobbesian notion of political authority' is needed in order to reconcile a system of rights with a coexistent freedom and peace.
M.C. Dillon's paper, uReversibility and Ethics: The Question of Violence," continuing the themes of human violence and violence in relation to language, argues against two theoretical standpoints. The first contends that all human action entails violence. The second contends that discourse, the traditional alternative to violent confrontation, 18 itself necessarily violent. Dillon contends that the conjunction of these two obscures significant differences betwecn violent and non-violent human bchavior and, thereby, atrophies a legitimate moral animus against violence. The standpoint he defends rests on the assertion that humans are capable of direct perceptual experience of thc pain of other humans, that this experience is the ground phenomenon of morality, and that it allows us in principle to adjudicate between violent and non-violent action, to distinguish among kinds and degrees of violence, and to assess evidence hearing on questions ofvindication and cuJpability.
This essay begins with an important limitation of violence to the human sphere of forcefuJ imposition of human will, thus removing it from the broader conversation of violence inclusive of natural vioJence, which itseJf, as seen above, can be seen in humans.
Dillon points out that the "political standpoint he [MerJeau-Ponty] attributes to Marxism is challenged by the ethical implications of the thesis of reversibility he developed in his lateT writings" [85] . Dillon goes on to consider this view that violence is unavoidable, and that it is a matter of choosing OUT violence. He contrasts this radical view that eliminates the pacifist alternative with the equally radical view that the non violent alternative mu~t always be sought. One always available alternative to violent action is rational discourse, for instance, in the peace process during a violent war. If, however, discourse itself is considered a form of violence, then again violence is unavoidable. And this is the argument supporting semiological rcductionism. uTbc violence of signifiers is inescapable because a11 experience is mediated by signifiers and is meaningless without them.
n To perceive a thing is to violate the ipseity of the thing, since we are barred from the signified [88] .
According to semiological reduction, language is always violent, as is human action, always violating the others' propriety. And here it becomes difficult to distinguish types of violence.
Dillon gives an intriguing account of semiological reductionism in its view that the signified can never be present, even to the witnesses or victims themselves, and therefore "violence atrophies as a measure of moral judgment" [91] . Dillon sees the mistake of semiological reductionism to lie in the inference that the "significance of all persons, places, and events is exclusively determined by the cultural fonns or signifiers that inform OUf experience of them. ... meaning derives exclusively trom signi fiers" [92] . Thus, this position demands that meaning is ideal. hThis premises has the effect of ruling out the possibility that the persons, pIace, and events, themselves, playa crucial role in the fonnation and application of immanent fonns or signifiers" [91] [92] . And, of course, Dillon hotds the contrary.
Dillon holds that we do have access, for judgment, to others in the context of the ethics of reversibility, where "I am capable of direct experience of another -where I can direclly perceive the intentions of others in their bodily comportment, where it is possible for roe to sense the sense of another's sensing of methat the perceptual experience provides an evidential basis for judgments I may make about it" [92] . And evidence is accessible to 'third parties, so that at least fallible but non-arbitrary judgments can be made. And it is in this domain of discemment and judgment that the radical positions making violence absolute fail, in spite of a positive element of each: Marxism reminding us that every action has a political dimension; and deconstruction in "demonstrating the pervasive and insidious effects of systems of signifiers operating beneath the level of deliberation and awareness" [94] .
For Dillon, violenee is always bad, but is sometimes justified, so that therefore there can be good fights and just wars. These, however, are to be avoided except as a last recourse. There is no purity. Yet, violenee as such cannot necessarily and in every case be condemned. Mediation is preferable to any violence, and truth is its ultimate ground, eommanding assent even from differing panies. And although discourse can be violent, it is not originary violence, but, rather, even as fallible, is OUf main recourse against violence.
In the final analysis, 'the question of violence is finally a question of love-hate-indifference,", a thought that according to Dillon, has guided this essay all along its way. "Nobility, aeting in accordance with one's highest ideals, ideals founded ultimately on the pathos of reversibility, is the locus of the criteria by which to judge violence" [100] . This nobility is the attempt to render the Greek word, "Kolon," and, as such, is the basis for judging everything, including violence.
In his article, " I An Ethics of Violence Justifying Itselt: t Sartre's Explorations of Violence and Oppression," Robert Bemasconi stresses the continuities in Sartre's various reflections on violence, emphasizing the strands of the Notebooks for an Ethics that anticipate and shed light on the tater and more familiar accounts. He does this, however, without implying that Sartre held a single view across this period. Bemasconi's reflection traces the contours ofSartre's profound insight and recognition of the udepth of the violenee inherent in societyu [I 17] . He points out that Sartre's various discussions of violence manifest a sense of exploration, and hence should be read as provocations to think further rather than as dogmas -a manner of reading that we will see in the articlcs by Mui and Flynn, and one that Bemasconi expertly sets into motion.
In his Notebooks for an Ethics Sartre lists principles in an attempt to expose justifications of violence, while, in the same work. he bies to show the revoJutionary possibiJities of violence in invoking the same principles. He sanetions the use of violence by the left, which itself has had violence done to it. And, even further, Sartre seerns to agree with the Maoists in that revoIutionary violence bom among the masses is considered to be moral. Bemasconi's thesis contends that such comments not only must be seen in the context of their times, hut also must be assessed "in the broader context of Sartre's reflections on violence, particularly in that most exploratory of books, Notehooks for an Ethics" [117] . This article draws a wealth of insight from the manner in which Sartre interrelates violence, oppression, revolution and law, with vioIence and oppression more explicitly interrelated and distinguished. Violence can only be considered in relation to laws that it violates, while oppression can be institutional, and thus is legitimated by Jaw, giving sanction to the oppressing class at the expcnse of the oppressed class. These conditions obtain for the society with slaves, for the bourgeois society of capitalism, as weil as in the United States society with the condition of the blacks. This is an illustration of the insight that violence always attempts to legitimate itself, leading to institutional forms of violence. And it becornes part of the legitimating of the violence against such institutions "to disclose the violence that created and sustained" such institutions [107] . The "rights" of the oppressors is legitimated by law, making it unlawful for the oppressed to change the conditions of oppression, thus revealing, for Sartre, the connection between right and violence. And violence is the condition for a new order to be initiated. The true revolutionary does not claim such rights, but rather, attempts to destroy the "idea of rights which they understand as a hoax of the privileged class" [109] . The oppression and the right it sanctions must be destroyed.
Bemasconi goes on to show that in the Crilique o[Dia/ectica/ Reaso1l, the emphasis moves from the act to the conditions of violence, focusing on violence as scarcity, and thus rcsolving the negative in history. Sartre aims in this work is to appeal to history rather than to economic or sociological interpretation, emphasizing fTee praxis over detenninism. This dynamics can be applied to the violence in colonization. "Past oppressive praxis produced the situation n [114]. This essay takes into account the ramifications of violence to thc colonized, the complicity of the oppressed, and the necessity of violenee for the eolonized, which results from the prior violence ofthe colonizers.
These are the contours of a diseourse on the ethics of violence justifying itsel f.
The body-as-object, and, finally, body-for-others, which, in the traditional interpretation, runs the risk of challenging the unity of the Iived body or the body-for-itseJf. Thus, the body-for-others is tied to Sartre's development of "the look,n which makes one aware of her/his body-as-object. In the look the Othcr is presented to me as a conscious subject capable of tuming me into an object. As such, because of the look, the other must be a conscious subject with freedom.
It is in this light from Sartre's ontology that Mui now takes up the problem of pomography, reconstituting women's oppression in these ontological tenns, showing how wornen, within a culture of "the look" -women-watching -suffer not merely a loss of dignity, but of being. To quote Mui, "'The look' affirrns the freedom of the looker as subject at the expense of the freedom looked-at, the person gazed upon." [ 125] And Uthe look" in pomography, produced for the heterosexual male voyeur, fol1owing the same analysis, is drastically worse. Thc object of the voyeur's gaze makes her exist in a stnJcture that reduces her whole being to an "inert body that is solicited, probed, scrutinized, and appropriated by a gazer." In this case, the woman in pomography does not exist her body, she exists as a very impersonaJ body, thus especially betraying the subjectivity of woman. Since the woman here is not ever a particular subject, pomography objectifies, not a woman, but rather, the idea of woman, and thus all wornen, who suffer a loss of being. Surprisingly, Mui admits that her argument does not imply that all pomography is necessarily inauthentic, but rather issues a challenge to anti-censorship feminists who are interested in working toward a feminist "re-vision" of pomography. It is ultimately achallenge as to whether or not "it is possible to secure people's status as free subjects within the context of 'the look'." [128 ] Thomas Flynn's article, "Sartre on Violence, Foucault on Power -A Diagnostic," focuses on violence in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre beginning with the Preface to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched 0/the Earth, the terlni"us ad quem of an "evolution in a philosophical theory of violence that had occupied Sartre for some time and which, it seems clear to me, he never resolved to I () his satisfaction" [129] . For Sartre, fratemity and vioJence are two aspects of the social bond that he has not succeeded in reconciling. Flynn proposes to consider 'the lerlllinlls a quo of this theory from one of the earlier discussion of Sartre. f~e then turns to FoucaulCs treatment of violcncc nnd power, in order to ground some comparison and contrasts bctween Sartre and Foucault. Flynn is attempting to cast light on the question of the possibility and limit of dialogue diagnostic as illuminating a discourse and practice between existentialist and post-structuraIist philosophies in general. He shows throughout this artiele that violence ls an abiding concern of Sartre, especially in the second half of his career, yet as early as the composition of the Notebooks we find hirn "coming to tenns with the chal1enge of trying to reconcile the inevitable violence of our interpersonal and social lives with the fuH freedom of the existentialist individual that he had championed in Being and Nothingness'" [142] .
Since Flynn considers Sartre to be always an ontologist, a philosopher of the imagination, and amoralist, he treats Sartrets "mini treatise" on vioJence in the Flynn goes on with the quote and his analysis to point out the psychological element added by Sartre, i.e., the lie that hides the victim's freedom-refusal in the liar's bad faith, a psychologieal element that Foueault will be seen to avoid. Sartre, in a sense, sets himself off fonn others to some extent, in that nonvoluntary violence would not be an entirely meaningful notion, as also becomes clear in the later distinction between physical and moral violence. This is a restricted use of the sense of violence, but he is consistent in this. In tuming to the imaginary and violence, we must realize the centratity for Sartre for such a consideration, since the imagination is already central to his onto]ogy, seen above. It is the imagination that allows us to "derealize" perceptual objects and thus to consider possibility, negativity and lack, as weil as to deceive. Flynn interestingly observes, getting to the core of the role of the imagination here t Although not all uses of the imaginary entail vio]ence, it seems to me that most. if not all, cases of Sartrean violence emp]oy the imaginary. And it is the act of lying that is for Sartre the model of violence, for the lie transfonns nlan into a thing. But at the same time it wants to keep hirn free, at least in most cases" (NE 198) [ 133J. Flynn considers the lie as a compendium of the element of Sartrean violence, summarizing it around five aspects characteristic of both.
Violence t like the lic, shows an option for the inertia and passivity of the victim as thing, exploiting the ambiguity of the in-itself/for-itself ontology of human reality, inheriting at once its ultimate failure. Secondly, the lie and violence entail a negation of time by sheer power of will as refusing being-in-the-world in favor ofan immediacy as "timeless" time ofnature, ofthings: first by appeal to analytic necessity, carrying over into the realm of identity and essence t as a refusal; and second, by the denial or refusal of world, thus negating temporality. Flynn brings up a couple ofpoints here that are important for this volume, as weil as for the issue of violence in Sartre: "Although Sartre is phenomenologically astute in observing the implicit collapse of temporal spread of lived time into the atemporal instant, he overlooks one of the most prevalent fonns of violence, namely that which infests the future by means of threat." First, relevant to Sartre view and to Flynn's critique, threat is a violence, not considered by Sartre, that does indeed entail the future in vioJence; but, second, in indicating Sartre's astuteness regarding the temporal spread of lived time in relation to the atemporal instant, Flynn serves to showt as arises in other articles contributed to this volume, a place of focus in relation to a 10ss by postmodern deconstruction, that iSt as will be seen, the 10ss of the Jived for the abstract in Derrida's critique ofHusserl, a failure that is not irrelevant to the question of violence, as becolncs explicit in the article considered above: "Taming VioJence: Ricoeur and Derrida."
The third element of the lie in violence is that of destruction or the nihilating power of consciousness acting, in violence, through the imagination. And fourth, as with the lie, the violent person lives in bad faith due to the counting on the richness of the world to support his destructions and to provide new things to be destroyed. And, finally, like the lie, violence is a self-defeating behavior (conduit d 'echec ) as a way of "evading the harsh demands of praxis and the real" [137] . We can now turn to violence and the moral.
At the heart of this consideration of violence and the moral, Flynn notes Sartre's speaking of an "ethic of violence" '~ust as he sometimes refers to a "bourgeois cthic." It is clear that the ethical properly speaking, that set of relationships between free agents mutually respecting and fostering one another's frccdom -that this ideal. at least in our present socioeconomic condition, is simply that." He mentions that Sartre in the Critique focusing on the quasi transcendental role of scarcity that ends up in warring camp. and the consequent description of violence as interiorized scarcity. Flynn proceeds to treat three ethical concepts from the Notebooks that entail violence: the spirit of seriousness; the ethics of rights and duties; and bad faith.
The spirit of seriousness reflects the familiar inauthentic attitude of the moral absolutist that Sartre so adamantly opposes as the antithesis of moral creativjty~thus constituting a fonn of violence in positing values at the cxpense of Sartrean authentie freedom. Similarly, the ethic ofrights and duties arising out ofthe enlightenment tradition entails an acontextual ethic of obligations and demands driving toward unity and uniformity, thus constituting a violence to the singularity and uniqueness of the concrete person and situation. Thi8 rendition of violence reveals the latent violence of such a Kantian onentation that is not brought baek to the earth of the singularity of the situation of particular judgment in situation. Flynn goes on to show that "If 'demand' is violent in its insensitivity to the unique situation of each agent, 'appeal' is the bond among freedoms that respects the individual in his or her singularity. In faet, the gift-appeal relationship emerges from the Notebooks as the model for the non-alienating reciprocity that authentie morality requires" [140] And, finally, regarding bad faith, Flynn begins by disagreeing with Sartre himself conceming the ethical import of bad faith, showing the distinctive disvalue in the tenn. The violence of bad faith is entailed in having another in me, as I am an other and this other is not me, in the fonn of my obligation, in which I deliberately eonceal from myself that I am the source of this obligation. Of the many forms of violence eonsidered in this context, it cao be seen that they entail any constraint on my conseiousness-freedom imposed by another freedom contrary to my wiJling it, even if it is from my own freedom as other. And it is worth mentioning the three types of violence that Sartre insists upon: Offensive. Defensive, and Counter violenee. Now Flynn tums to Foucault on power/violence.
Flynn notes the obvious opposition between Sartre and Foucault in the latter's rejection of philosophies of eonsciousness and subjectivity along with totalizing thought in favor of impersonal rules and systems, and in his linguistie turn. He then notes three theses about Foucault's use of"power tt in the attempt to focus on his understanding of violence. Ieading to a comparison and contrast with that of Sartre. These theses focus on the tenn upower" as a set of strategie relations between individuals or groups, as relations of struggle and resistanee; his analyses of these 15 impcrsonal as befits sueh a philosophical analysis. And these power struggles. though impersonal, are between individuals and groups, falling into line with his view that power denotes "action on the action of others" [145] And Foueault comes elose to Sartre in insisting on the need to identify the agents responsible for social domination. Thus, it is seen that. rather than Sartre's primacy of individual praxis in social causation, Foucault uncovers the "mechanisms of power" as the techniques and procedures that serve the interest of the bourgeoisie at a certain time. And it is the notion of power in Foueault that must be seen in relation to violence. before a comparison and contrast are possible with Sartre.
2..
Power aets not directly on others, but rather on the actions of others. In itself the exereise of power is not violence, nor a consent, but rather is a "way of acting upon the acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action [147] . This point leads to the comparison bctwecn Sartre and Foucault on the basic interplay of power and freedom in Foucault's analysis. Flynn shows how Foucault speaks less of essential freedom, as does Sartre, but rather of an agonism "of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal ineitation and struggle; less of a face. . .to...face eonfrontation whieh paralyzes both sides than a pennanent provocation" [148] .
Flynn's discussion of Sartre and Foucault to this point has aimed at the diagnostic 3t the end, in which he compares and contrast explieitly the two views of violenee. The first point of agreement between them is that violenee ean take place only between free individuals or groups, thus allowing the experience of freedom to' be a starting point for such comparison and contrast. Yet, Flynn indicates three points of sharp contrast: first, their model of social intelligibility; sccond the means of analysis, and third t the goal of emancipation from violence.
Flynn suggest that perhaps the only spaee for fruitful dialogue between these two thinkers is freedom, for each of whom this is central. He goes on to show the problematic dimension of eaeh thinker regarding freedom and violence, leading to impossibilities within the doctrine of each, and concluding that this may be their legacy to our post-modem situation, the possibility of the impossibility of their respective impossibilities. Thus is revealed explicitly the deconstructive process operative in this fine article, and its place in this volume.
Riehard Cohen begins, in his artiele, uLevinas: just War or Just war: Preface to Totality and IIljinity," with the fact that the worst fonn of violence is war. This focus is central to the short prefaee to Totality and lnfinity, written after, and eontinuous with, its concluding section on the ethical relation of the faee-to...face "between I and other where both terms retain their independence by relating aeross moral and juridical demands, he characterizes the pluralism of the ethical relation as alone making peace possible n [J 53... 154] . This artiele shows how this is the ease. The discussion of peace at the end of this work iSt as a function of the plurality of persons made possible by ethics t the context for the preface on war, thus constituting, in a way, a working from war to peace. War, for Levinas, suspends and makes a mockery ofmorality, holding in abeyance the command not to murder emanating from the ethical proximity of the face to face t commanding not to murder, and conjuring forth the responsibility and obligation for the other in its transcendent alterity. Thus t War, then, as this suspension, is worse than the opposite of moraJity. as eviI is the opposite of good. u ••• war exceeds opposition by totalization the elimination of othemess. War is the mockery of the entire ethical schematism. This schematism: (I) "absolute good orienting from above, manifest through the transcending moral height of the other, the other's absolute priority over the self; (2) Good versus evil, the other as needy; (3) "absolute evil below, killing, war, the suspension of morality. For Levinas t the ethical self becomes an insatiable desire for the most desirable as the ugood beyond being," once this self is charged by the transcendence of the face to face. And concrete ethical life takes place within this schema, judging goods and evils as closer or farther from that pure, orienting good. War is a mockery of this whole schematism. As absolute good makes the ethical realm possible, war renders the same realm extra -moral, "tuming it into an atnoral play of forces, interactions whose significance comes without reference to good and evil". War then becomcs absolute violence, "violence absolutized, force against force" [J 58] And if war is the ultimate ground for signification, then to be sincerely moral is to be duped by morality, a view with which Levinas and Cohen do not agree. Thus is revealed the context for Levinas's initial question of being duped by morality, the context of the entire struggle of good against evil in the light of the hierarchical schematism mentioned above. This leads to the relation between the truth and the good, between reason and the moral, and to the question of whether reason can see the reason for being moral, or, indeed, whether it has to for one to be good or responsible. The good reaches the self at a level prior to lucidity of reason, prior to its capacities of identification. "Knowing, then, will take the unsolicited shock of morality far ignorance, foolishness, naivete, slaverytt [160] . But the truth of this mind is fixed in the concept oftotality for Levinas.
Cohen follows Levinas in tra'cing the intimate relation between the Uinterests of epistemology and an ontology of war, war as the ultimate vision of epistemology," [163] where reality takes on the sense of a calculus of force. But, rather, if this epistemology does not have the last word, and ifwe are not duped by morality, then politics takes on a different meaning, wars would be distinguished between just and unjust, sincerity and not totality would be the ground of the troe, and politics would serve or dis-serve the good [165] . And rather than might making right, politics would become Uanother way of instituting goodness,"
[165] taking on aquasi messianic role, and peace would underlie struggle and war. This would be a genuine peace, not the peace of might makes right which is basically a dimension of war violating by repressing singularity of onese)f and of others. One can approach another in peace only by means ofproximity: ccOnly the radical alterity of the other person has the force -moral force -to obligate and fix the self, the self subject as subjected to the o'ther, as responsibility for the other" [166] . This proximity is the wherein ofthe constitution ofthe ultimate and ethical significance of the world. In this context, genuine peace would arise from the proximity of unique singularity in which the significance comes from an ethical breach in the totaJity, thus transcending the reach of the totalization of war and inscrting a non-cognitive moral dimension into philosophical discourse. "Before one knows the good, one does the good," [167] because the demands, obligations, and responsibilitics are more important than knowledge and give it significance. The desire for goodness is more desirable than the desire to know. And the resulatant peace is one of pluralism, oriented toward and by the good, where each is responsible for the other, where obligations and responsibilities weigh upon each self for each other and for all others. And this weight is the moral self. USingularity emerges as a nonsubstitutable responsibility, a moral burden upon which the reality of the whole world depends. Or else there is just war. But war cannot surpass this pacific relation to the other, this sincerity,
. James Marsh, in URationality and Its Other," attempts to outline a phenomenoJogy of the other in response to postmodern challenges to phenomenology and other forms of western rationality. He points out that if, indeed, modem, western rationality is essentially opposed to the other, inevitably dominating her, excluding her, reducing her to sameness, then a recourse to a post-modem, post-western fonn of rationaIity becomes necessary, whether one cal1 that 'genealogy' or 'Denken' or 'negative dialectic' or 'deconstruction,' to name a few of the more common alternatives.' Marsh proposes to test such claims and answer these question by beginning smalI, doing patient phenomenological descriptions of various fonns of rationality as we experience them. Such descriptive accounts liberate us from atomism in perception, and descriptively ground philosophical discourse with evidence, thus avoiding arbitrariness in denying the dichotomy between consciousness and the olher.
This phenomenological description of conversation, articuJating this essential dimension, shows how such a relation to the other occurs. In this account of a conversation on a point of disagreement, Marsh indicates four positive possibiJities in a non-aJienated conversation that does justice to othemess: "one person agreeing freely and rationalJy, both persons moving to a third position, each person modifying their position in relation to the other's, and both persons remaining where they were at the beginning of the conversation" [177] . Each of these possible positions entails ablend of ideality and difference. Even in an uncoerced comp)ete agreement, difference is present, just as in complete disagreement, identity is present. And the negative possibility of coercion or violence are experiences as illegitimate reductions to sameness, as abuse, violating the basic thrust of the conversation toward a "rational, free agreement respectful of difference and listening to the other." This violence is experienced as irrational or at least as inadequately rational, thus requiring a more adequate ronn ofrationality.
Marsh uses the descriptive account to deal with objections to such a priority given to relations to the other in a conversation. He shows how the transcendence to the other is preserved without a reduction of the relation descriptively ascertained. Marsh admits his legitimate presupposition of that as true: "eidetic description of the conversation reveals it to be govemed by the value of consensus." Such consensus is presupposed by conversation even when some participants are insincere. It is a deficient conversation if that goal or norm is violated. Further, a post-modem or Levinasian critique of phenomenology, to the extent that it is based on a conception of consciousness as purely active, is a caricature, since even Husserl recognized a passivity and receptivity to conscious experience.
We experience the other person as a presence different from that of a stone or an animal, capable of areal and genuine conversation. thus revealing nlultiple kinds of othemess of experience. Here alone we expericnce community in unique way with other humans in contrast to the commonness that we experience with things as made of the same stuff, or with animals. This unique communitarian dimension leads us to anticipate responses from the other not anticipated from things or animals. Thus there is a self-revelation of interiority. In the fully reciprocal relation of a conversation, Marsh overcomes the hyperbolical antithesis of interior and exteriority, allowing the conversation to leave in taet both interiority and the transcendence of the other. In this presence of the other we have the basis for consensus "as a regulative ideal in conversation.
u Marsh concludes that if such an account of conversation with the other is troe t then not only is such a consciousness and conscious rationality open to its other in a first order way, but also. such a phenomenology is open to its other, and thus is not closed off to its other. There is not an essential gap between rationality and its other, but rather, "an essential link and connection. Reason in general and modemist tationality in panicular is being most rational when it is most fully open to its other. least rational when it is most closed.
n Marsh show that if consciousness as lived is already open as his descriptive account shows, and if such phenomenology can criticize inadequate or dominating ways of relating to the other, "then postmodern rejection or transcendence or overcoming of such rationality seems implausible." We turn now to the last article in this collection, one entailing a rather novel and interesting interpretation of Sade in terms of violence. 111i8 article by Colette Michael, "La vioJence peut-eJ/e eire L(;~ilime?," focuses on the Marquis de Sade, sonle of whose works present the epitome of violence, seeking in Sade's own writings for a solution to problems these works pose conceming sexual abuse, torture, and the injustice and abuses against the weak. Michael discusses one such solution of de Sade against physical abuse and violence that are sometimes legal.
Although an author should not be confused with his imaginary works and characters, the Marquis has had attributcd to hirn the black soul [/'lime Iroire] ofhis protagonists. Michael, taking into account the point of deconstructive critical theory, that a text can survive the absence of its author and occasional circumstances, noles the coincidenee of Sadc's reeent popu)arity with the emergence of this new mode of literary criticism. Michael questions the interpretations of Sadc's works that, overlooking his contradictions or ignoring othcr tcxts, interpret SOfllC of his works as antifeminist texts; or, others that, ignoring the intention of the author, the intended audienee, the context and the code, consider some of his texts to be pornographie. Michael proposes that the lesson or message of Sade goes a lot further and is different than that, even containing some positive content. She begins by focusing on the much condemned work: A/ille et Va/cour.
From this story of violence to Aline by her sexually abusive father, Michael draws lessons that are not the usual ones, in this context of Sade's work. First, Aline's virtuous mother, faithful to her marriage vows. to the point of defending her husband's incestuous aberrations, ends up being poisoned by hirn, thus showing 'lhat such injustice and violenee, even in obedience to marriage vows, does not necessarily lead to happiness or salvation. After the death of her mother, Aline, without her mother's support to marry Valcour, her lover, and against the violence of her father, commits suicide, thus responding with a violence to the violence of unnatural incest. Thus, de Sade does not suggest filial obedience or wifely submission. But such self-suffering is not the only outcome for Sade. He sometimes proposes revolt, as in the three, vastly differing, versions of JuslilIe. Justine's virtues of Christian morality and her good actions are rewarded by renewed calamities. After many misfortunes, being raped by someone whom she helped free, tortured, etc., she continues to have faith in the prineiples of moraJity which she was taught and which defend the eommandments of God and of the ChUTCh. "Nothing can make her loose her faith" [187] . But one has to see the more subtJe message of Sade presented by Michael: "Quite clearly Sade condemns with one aecord the whole of French society of the 18 th century, a society which imprisoned hirn for thirty years, or, if you prefer. a society that condemned without solid proof, innocents such as Justine and Sade" [187] . Faced with the various fonns of criminality, the Christian morality of Justine does not function in her favor. Vet she simply opposes violence with her virtue; against crime, she opposes her faith; against malefactoTs, she opposes her Christian benevolence. These are not valid, and she must revolt, just as Sade must revolt against the French society that imprisoned hirn. Sade shows the necessity for revolt with his writings that constitute a violenee yet unequaled in Jiterature. And, with further analysis of the text, Michael shows precisely how Sade, identifying with Justine, could weil be seen to be a masochiste instead of the traditionally understood sadist. Also, one could conelude from thc overly passive attitude to one of encouraging crime, and that Justine should revolt.
It would be narrow to interpret Sade only in the antifeminist and pornographie context, since his passages are not too arousing, and since wornen at times also play the executioner. Thus, there is no absolute in Sade, neither good nor bad. His works, written while imprisoned, and shocking the innocent reader, create a perpetuat vengeance against the society that has unjustly condemned hirn. Against the violence against his own freedom, he has reacted and imagined an unequaled violence in language. uHe has in this fact created the perfect crime, a crime that perpetuates itself each time that an offended reader rejeets and flees it U [191] . One must clearly in certain cases refuse to bend to abuses, even legal abuses. And Justine exemplifies another less than obvious truth: that, in religious precepts as weIl as in laws of the country, obcdience is valid only jf these are acccpted equally by thc "other." "To the question posed by Sade, what to do when faced with violence, 'The wise and virtuous Justine, revolted from a system, too unhappy fruit of corruption,' gives this response: 'Evil is useful on earth; and, when God desires it, it is surely a mistake to oppose it.' It is up to us to interpret" [192] .
In concluding, it is prudent to realize that, even in a postmodern situation that address violence, there is no end of violence, nor to the discourse on violence. We can, however, make the effort to put violence in its place, and hope thereby in some sense to hetter the human lot.
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